Leopards and Their Spots:

The Problem of Syria.

  • The lifting of US sanctions on Syria represents real threats and risks, both to the stability of the region and to global security.
  • The nature and intentions of the Syrian transitional government, which has declared itself a specifically Islamist state and is led by a former Jiihadist, remain unclear.
  • ISIS appears to be attempting to re-establish itself in Syria. If the group can liberate any portion of the thousands of ISIS associates currently imprisoned in Syria, it would be a significant force multiplier. ISIS ideological messaging, meanwhile, will attract and inspire foreign fighters and homegrown actors across the West.

Two Presidents

There were many memorable moments in US President Donald J. Trump’s visit to the Middle East in May. But one of the most surprising was his announcement, in Riyadh, that the United States would lift all its sanctions on Syria. The following day, in an equally surprising turn of events, Trump sat down for a meeting with Syrian “transitional” president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Afterwards, Trump announced that al-Sharaa was willing to consider joining the Abraham Accords, the 2025 agreement under which the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco normalized their relations with Israel. Trump characterized al-Sharaa as a “young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Very strong past. Fighter.”

Opportunity Knocks?

As always, there is good news and bad news here. Commentators from across the political spectrum agree that lifting the sanction regime is a positive development in the aftermath of Syria’s devastating, 13-year civil war. Robert Ford, Barack Obama’s ambassador to Syria, said the country “…needs to rebuild, it needs reconstruction, it needs foreign financing…removing the sanctions will enable international capital flows into Syria from Gulf States, from other Arab states and from different aid agencies…” For Middle Eastern and international investors, the prospect of rebuilding Syria and its infrastructure represents a proverbial gold mine.

Can We Wish a Terrorist Group Away?

Part of the problem is al-Sharaa’s “very strong past.” As reported in a previous Canadian Intelligence Brief, Sharaa has a long jihadist pedigree. His armed faction, Hay’at Tahrir al-Shams (HTS), which now forms the Syrian transitional government, is an outgrowth of the anti-Assad “Nusra Front” coalition, which was linked to ISIS and, subsequently, to al Qaeda. HTS remains a listed terrorist entity in Canada although its foreign terrorist entity designation was revoked effective July 8, 2025 by the U.S. Department of State as “an important step in fulfilling President Trump’s vision of a stable, unified, and peaceful Syria.”

Continuing Violence

The other problem is that Syria is neither stable, unified, nor peaceful. In March, after a series of confrontations between Assad loyalists and transitional government troops, militia groups, vigilantes and government troops attacked Alawite civilians (the Assad family were Alawites, a Shia Muslim minority in Syria), resulting in the sectarian massacre of more than 1,000 civilians. In June, a suicide bomber killed 25 Syrian Christians as they attended a service at Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus. 

Beginning in May, a series of attacks on Druze communities (a religious minority related to, but distinct from, Islam) in Syria’s Suwayda province by Sunni Bedouin groups has resulted in an estimated 1100 casualties. This brought Israel into the mix. In an apparent effort to support Syrian Druze, the IDF launched a series of airstrikes, first on Syrian government troops in Suwayda, and then on military targets in Damascus. Israel has a significant Druze community of its own, one which is routinely targeted by Jihadist actors, but the real reason for these strikes is probably more about sending a message to the new regime in Damascus.  

Al-Sharaa and the transitional government seem to be working hard to distance themselves from these outbreaks of serious sectarian violence. In an official proclamation, al-Sharaa characterized the church bombing victims as “martyrs” and a transitional government inquiry into the Alawite massacre exonerated its field commanders. And while transitional government troops were supposedly deployed to separate Bedouin and Druze belligerents in Suwayda, they also managed to kill “scores” of Druze and participated in ritual humiliation of Druze men and religious leaders.  Meanwhile, the transitional government is  dealing with a resurgence of ISIS (al-Shaara’s erstwhile allies), which appears to be establishing itself even in areas under government control. The Damascus church firebombing bears all the earmarks of an ISIS attack.

The Islamist Factor

Early analysis hypothesizing that Sharaa and his transitional government might be an ISIS or al Qaeda front is losing its persuasiveness, especially given the apparent role of ISIS in trying to destabilize an already unstable situation. And al-Sharaa appears to be at least trying to say all the right things, whether in his meeting with the US President or in his promises to protect the rights of all Syrians. But the new Syrian “Constitutional Declaration,” which al-Sharaa signed into law in March, is unequivocally Islamist, stating that “[t]he religion of the President of the Republic is Islam, and Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.” 

Of course, an Islamist is by no means automatically a Jihadist. But, again, al-Sharaa is a former Jihadist, and states that are governed strictly on Islamist principles are rarely particularly tolerant of religious and cultural minorities over the long term: think Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. Given the pressures of ethnic and religious insurgencies, Israeli airstrikes and incursions into Syrian territory, and the (justified, given the history of the region) resentment and fear of ordinary Syrian Christians, Druze, and Alawites, Sharaa and his transitional government may yet revert to type.

Why Do We Care?

Syria currently has about 23,000 foreigners in detention, all of whom are suspected of being ISIS members (although large numbers of them are women and children, many of whom may in fact be victims of ISIS human trafficking operations). Given that the transitional government still appears to be trying to consolidate its rule in the face of an ISIS resurgence, the security of these camps is in some doubt. The threat – and associated risk – of the release of large numbers of imprisoned ISIS fighters into an already unstable region is high. A less likely but equally troublesome scenario is that Sharaa and the transitional government may bring international pressure to bear to transfer some of these detainees back to their home countries, including Canada. 

During its first incarnation, ISIS attracted foreign fighters and inspired homegrown actors throughout the West. If the group can replicate its seductive combination of violent ideology, religious eschatology, and slick propaganda, a particularly insidious form of radicalization to violence, accelerated by social media, may once again emerge in Canadian communities, schools and other social and cultural institutions. 

As above, the lifting of US sanctions on Syria and the US revocation of the HTS terrorist entity designation represents tremendous business and financial opportunities, both in the Middle East and in the wider world. HTS remains a listed entity in Canada. But Canadian employees of foreign companies, and US and European affiliates of Canadian companies, could conceivably find themselves operating in Syria without necessarily understanding the level of threat and risk. This includes everything from terrorist attacks on business facilities and construction sites, to hostage-takings. 

Finally, it is impossible to emphasize enough the degree of caution that must be exercised regarding al-Shaara and his transformation of Syria – historically, one of the most cosmopolitan countries in the region, even under the Assad regime – into a state run on Islamist principles. Again, Islamism and terrorism are not synonymous. But many Islamist groups are terrorist, and some Islamist countries are exporters of terror. This is a serious problem. According to the French Fondation pour l’innovation politique (Fondapol), Islamist terrorist attacks increased from 12.4% of total global terrorist attacks between 2001 – 2012, to 84.4% of total between 2013 – 2024. And despite the widespread conception that Islamist terrorism primarily targets Israel and the West, 86.3% of Islamist terrorist attacks occur in Muslim majority countries, and 88.9% of their casualties are Muslim. Islamist based terrorism is a major driver of political and social instability, both in the Middle East, and in the wider world. 

This assessment is based on information current as of 1200 hours EST on July 23, 2025.