Brave New Syria.
The End of an Era: What Syria’s Regime Change Means for Global Security
Regime Change In Syria.
On December 8, a coalition of Syrian opposition forces, led by the rebel faction, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), took the Syrian capital city of Damascus after a fast-moving 10-day offensive that saw the total collapse of the regular Syrian Army. This was effectively the end of a thirteen-year civil war, which began with the events of the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, as well as the end of almost half a century of rule by the al-Assad family. Bashar al-Assad, the deposed President, has been given political asylum by Russia.
The situation in Syria remains highly kinetic, with the collapse of the Assad regime creating a rapidly changing environment. There is no doubt that the end of over four decades of Assad family rule will have a profound impact on a region already struggling with the aftermath of multiple conflicts. This shift in power dynamics is complicated by critical intelligence gaps, some of which could have far-reaching consequences on a global scale.
The Losers.
Aside from Assad, there are a couple of clear losers here. One is Iran. The Assad family are Alawites, an Islamic sect that is closely related to Shia Islam. Ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Tehran has looked to Syria and the Assads as allies in its aspirations for a “Shia Crescent” extending from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon. But with the severe degradation of Lebanon-based Hezbollah in its war with Israel, Iran lost its most important proxy in the region, leaving it pretty much powerless to protect its interests, or its clients, in Syria.
The other clear loser is Russia which, like Iran, has been one of the Assad regime’s main supporters. For years, Russia has maintained fighter aircraft facilities in Syria, as well as a huge naval base at the Mediterranean port of Tartus. But with the war in Ukraine draining men and materiel, there was little that Russia could do to assist its erstwhile ally. The timing of the uprising, and the HTS takeover, was undoubtedly linked to the weakness of Assad’s two best friends. But the “loss” of Syria as a client is a blow to Russian prestige and, even more importantly, its ability to project power and influence in the Middle East and Africa.
Who is Jolani?
As for clear winners, who knows? There are huge knowledge gaps around both the nature and intentions of the HST and its leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. For most of his career, Jolani was a Jihadist. In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, Jolani went to fight there as part of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group that eventually morphed into ISIS. He was closely linked to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ISIS leader. In 2011, at the beginning of the “Arab Spring,” al-Jolani established the so-called “Nusra Front,” an anti-Assad group closely linked to ISIS.
After a falling out with ISIS, Jolani went back to AQ, officially declaring that the Nusra Front was the “official” Syrian AQ affiliate. In 2016, Jolani and the Nusra Front split with AQ, and by 2020 claimed to have destroyed AQ networks in Syria and to have “deradicalized” ISIS linked terrorists and foreign fighters. Despite all this, HTS is still designated as a terrorist group by Canada, most of its allies including the United States, and various multilateral organizations. The United States is still offering a reward of $10 million for information about Jolani’s whereabouts. And there is a body of analytical opinion that suggests that the split between Jolani, HTS and AQ is a deliberate deception meant to draw attention away from the two groups’ actual intention, which is the establishment of a Jihadist-run Islamic state in the Levant.
For the moment, Jolani seems to be at pains to establish both his and HTS’s legitimacy. He has reverted to his proper name, Ahmed Hussein al-Shaara (al-Jolani is a nom-de-guerre employing the Arabic word for the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights region of Syria). He has also made numerous public statements assuring the West (and Israel) that he has no intention of taking this conflict beyond Syria’s borders. However, since December 8, HTS–affiliated social media networks have repeatedly shown clips of HTS members vowing to take the struggle all the way to “al-Aqsa,” a reference to Jerusalem and, by extension, Israel. For its part, Israel has been conducting airstrikes inside Syria, apparently intended to neutralize military infrastructure, and has also sent troops across the demilitarized zone between the two countries.
Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?
One possible indicator of Syria’s future under the HTS is the experience of Idlib Province, which has been under HTS control since 2015. In Idlib, HTS ruled through its political and administrative arm, the so-called Syrian Salvation Government, which maintained critical state sectors such as education and health care, albeit under supervision of a religious council guided by Sharia law. While this Islamist “mini-state” functioned reasonably well, Idlib is a largely rural region where a conservative form of Islam has always dominated. How HTS functions in large, liberal, multicultural urban settings like Aleppo and Damascus may be very different. And it is notable that HTS had an efficient program of rooting out and crushing opposition factions, including other Jihadists, throughout its tenure in Idlib. Syrian dissidents have characterized HTS and its security forces as not fundamentally different from the Assad regime.
Is HTS the latest Islamist extremist threat to arise in the Middle East? While Jolani / Shaara is certainly making the right noises, he has also expressed his admiration for the Taliban and, for now, appears to be trying to emulate Taliban diplomacy by positioning himself in a way that does not represent a threat to countries beyond its borders. The problem, as we know from our experience with the Taliban, with AQ, and with ISIS, is the very real possibility that HTS is the proverbial wolf in sheep’s clothing. If so, it represents a serious threat to whatever is left of regional (and global) stability.
Why Do We Care?
From a Canadian perspective, this raises a couple of concerns. One is related to the problem of radicalization to violence. Jihadist conflict in the Middle East, Africa, and even Afghanistan was highly influential in encouraging young Canadians to travel abroad as foreign fighters and even to act here at home. This phenomenon has not been a serious part of public discourse for almost a decade now, nor has it been a priority for government. This means that we no longer have a sense of how deeply embedded extremist narratives and recruiting are in specific communities, particularly the large Syrian refugee demographic. But recent arrests in Canada – including Ahmed and Mostafa Eldidi – suggest that we continue to have a problem in this regard. And given that at least two Jihadist actions in this country have targeted Parliament; to say nothing of the rising level of anger at the government and its Middle East policies, this represents a clear threat to Parliament and elected officials.
Syria has begun creeping into narratives surrounding Israel’s war with Hamas and Hezbollah. Pro-Hamas and -Hezbollah social media sites have characterized Israel’s bombardment of Syrian military sites, and its advance up to and across the DMZ, as “genocide.” While this is clearly rooted in fundamental ignorance as to what comprises genocide, it will probably serve to throw gasoline on an already raging fire of often violent antisemitism, thinly disguised as anti-Zionism. While this is mainly directed at Jewish communities (this past week, a Montreal synagogue was fire-bombed for the second time
this year and a Toronto Jewish day school was shot up for the third time), the threat to elected officials and the parliamentary precinct should also be considered elevated, especially if the new Syrian regime plays into this particular narrative.
